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THE SCOPE OF THE PHRASE "INTERSTATE
COMMERCE"-SHALL IT BE REDEFINED?
By THOMAS A. GILLIAM, of the Colorado Bar
"It is to Marshall that we turn for the description of the power
confided to Congress and its scope."-Chief Justice Hughes.'
Occasionally, judges are badgered by Philadelphia lawyers
into a rather extraordinary position. In 1946, Prudential Insur-
ance Company v. Benjamin 2 was decided by the Supreme Court,
a case which calls for some redefinition of Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 of the United States Constitution:
The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.
The Prudential case upheld the validity of the McCarran Act3
enacted in view of United States v. Southeastern Underwriters As-
sociation,4 in which the Court had declared that insurance is an
interstate business. Since before the latter decision, insurance was
generally thought not subject to the commerce clause, notably an
implication derived from Paul v. Virginia 5 the states had evolved
regulation of this phase of commerce, which Congress, by the
McCarran legislation, sought to implement and develop. The effect
of the Act was to declare, "that the continued regulation and tax-
ation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the
public interest, and that silence on the part of Congress shall not
be construed to impose a barrier" to such regulation or taxation.
In sustaining the validity of the Federal legislation, Mr. Jus-
tice Rutledge also answered the attacks made by the insurance
company on a state tax law, which for purposes of discussion he
assumed to be discriminatory:"
Here both Congress and South Carolina have acted,
'The Supreme Court of the United States, 143 (1928).
2 328 U. S. 408, 66 S. Ct. 1142, 90 L. Ed. 1342, 164 A. L. R. 476.
'59 STAT. 33, 15 U. S. C. A. 1011-1015 (1945).
322 U. S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944); rehearing denied in
323 U. S. 811, 65 S. Ct. 26, 89 L. Ed. 646 (1944).
575 U. S. 168, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1869); Hooper v. California, 155
U. S. 648, 15 S. Ct. 207, 39 I Ed. 297 (1895). For a similar situation in baseball,
of. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs, 259 U. S. 200, 42 S. Ct. 465, 66 L. Ed. 898 (1922), and Gardella v.
Chandler, 172 F. 2d 402 (2nd Cir., 1949).
6Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, note 2 supra, 429.
While Amendment XIV, Sec. 1, provides that no person shall be denied by a
state the equal protection of its laws, this to Rutledge was a dangerous blurring
of ideas. See Robertson v. People of the State of California, 328 U. S. 440, 66
S. Ct. 1160, 90 L. Ed. 1366 (1946); Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54
S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A. L., R. 1469 (1934); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U. S.
35, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L. Ed. 744 (1868); Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 62
S. Ct. 164, 86 L. Ed. 119 (1941) Douglas, concurring opinion.
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and in complete coordination, to sustain the tax. It is
therefore reinforced by the exercise of all the power of
government residing in our scheme. 7
And with reference to constitutional attacks made by Prudential 8
on the Congressional legislation itself, his answer was even more
out of the ordinary to the effect that these arguments are:
On the theory that no more has occurred than that
Congress has "adopted" the tax as its own, a conception
which obviously ignores the state's exertion of its own
power and, furthermore, seeks to restrict the cooridnated
exercise of federal and state authority by a limitation
applicable only to the federal taxing power when it is
exerted without reference to any state actionY (Italics
supplied.)
And while state action was not elevated to the same plane as the
congressional, the effect is virtually the same. 10 This superstate
idea appears elsewhere in the opinion with reference to federal-
state action. A gestalt results, the whole is greater than its parts.
To justify this conclusion Justice Rutledge reflected that begin-
ning with Gibbons v. Ogden," in the silence of Congress, i.e., when
that body has not acted under the great powers given it by the
commerce clause, the Court has often taken the initiative. The
author of Gibbons v. Ogden, Justice Rutledge, explained in a foot-
note quote was obliged to do so by necessity, saying, "Judges leg-
islate interstitially and the interstices were great in Marshall's
time." 12
Although there have been times when Congress had not agreed
with the efforts of the Court as a substitute legislature, and had
later disavowed the legislation; nevertheless he went on:
The fact remains that, in these instances, the sus-
taining of Congress' overriding action has involved some-
thing beyond correction of erroneous factual judgment in
deference to Congress' presumably better-informed view
of the facts and also beyond giving due deference to its
conception of the scope of its powers, when it repudiates,
7 Id. at 435-436.
8 Of this it was said at p. 412, "The versatility with which the argument in-
verts state and national power, each in alternation to ward off the others inci-
dence, is not simply a product of protective self-interest. It is the recurring
manifestation of the continuing necessity in our federal system for accommodat-
ing the two great basic powers it comprehends."
9 Id. at 438.
"Note 6 supra.
1" 22 U. S. 1, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
"Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 413, note 2 supra, citing
Ribble, State and National Power Over Commerce 47. Ribble's paper grew out
of Dean Stone's assignment, note 68 post.
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just as when its silence is thought to support, the infer-
ence that it has forbidden state action.1
This "something beyond" involved is never quite explained,
14
but an act of Congress had never before been elevated above the
Constitution. Marshall saw to that.'; Perhaps the Court was say-
ing that the origin of its own power to act in the silence of Con-
gress is obscure, and if Congress speaks what authority have we
to say, nay? Chief Justice Hughes once said, "the Constitution
is what the judges say it is,"' 6 but isn't it another matter, alto-
gether, to say that the Constitution is what the Congress says it
is when it sanctions state action? Justice Rutledge, nevertheless,
felt that such sanction was supported by "the whole trend of de-
cision." 1 Equally obscure, however, as the source of the Court's
power in the silence of Congress, is in coexistence with the former,
the origin of the power of Congress to enable the states to do that
which they otherwise could not.'6 Perhaps what Rutledge meant
was that, when the states and federal government form a partner-
ship in regulation, something in the nature of a treaty results. If
this be the case the necessity of redefinition is manifest, or at least
a historical reexamination of the trend of decision is indicated,
and since as all these matters troubled Marshall in the great case
of Gibbons v. Ogedn, it might be advisable to turn first, as all de-
cisions do, to that decision.
THE SCOPE OF THE POWER
Marshall has been much maligned. 19 He has left the impres-
sion of being the true apostle of federalism, the autocrat of the
bench, the uncompromising figure of judicial supermacy. Never
a popular figure, he filled the bill. And yet in Gibbons v. Ogden,
his only popular decision, 20 and in Willson v. Blackbird Creek
Marsh Co."1 he possibly indicated, at the beginning, the whole
scope of the commercial power, and upon review, as reexamination
of legends often do, the impression left by Marshall is somewhat
different from that assumed.
1Id. at 425-426.
" An explanation possibly lies in Article 1, Sec. 10, Cl. 2 of the CONSTITU-
TION: No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
its Inspection Laws.
"Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 137, 1 Cranch. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
"Cited by Abel, Commerce Regulation Before G4bbons v. Ogden; Interstate
Transoprtation Facilities, 25 N. CAR. L. R. 12 (1947).
,7 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 433, note 12 supra.
'sMurphy, Insurance Under the Commerce Clause. 33 IA. L. R. 91, 100
(1947).
" See Abel, Commernce Regulation Before Gibbons v. Ogden, Trade and Traf-
fic, 14 BROOKLYN L. R. 38, 215 (1941); Green, Solm, Heretical Renlirks on the
Federal Power Over Coimm erce. 31 MiN. . L. R. 121, 148 (1947).
'Mendelson, Ncw Light on, Fietcher v. Peck and Gibbov.s r. Oydeni. 58 Y.\r.r
L. J. 567 (1949).
2'27 U. S. 245, 2 Pet. 245, 7 L. Ed. 412 (1829).
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Gibbons v. Ogden did not involve an instance of a state acting
where Congress had not; on the contrary, a monopoly created by
state law, on steamship traffic on the Hudson was dissolved by
that decision as being in conflict with federal licensing legislation.
As Marshall pointed out, "The sole question is, can a state regluate
commerce with foreign nations and among the states, while con-
gress is regulating it?" 22 The answer to this question, counsel for
the monopoly urged, was that the states have concurrent power
in regulating commerce:
It is remarkable that even the definite article "the"
is omitted. . . . And this omission was not accidental, but
studiously made. By referring to the journals of the Fed-
eral convention, it will be found, that the sixth article of
Mr. Charles Pinkney's draft has the words "shall have
the power," etc. In the draft reported by the committee
of five (art. 7) the definite article is still preserved. In
the draft as reported by Mr. Brearly the word "the" is
left out, clearly by design. Notwithstanding that, Mr.
Patrick Henry and Mr. George Mason, and indeed, the
opposers of the constitution generally, thought . . . that
when power was given, it was "exclusively given." . . .
This construction, which was the general foundation of
the opposition to the constitution, was strenuously dis-
avowed and reasoned against in the Federalist, and ac-
tually produced the tenth article of the amendment.
2 2
It was Justice Johnson in a separate opinion, and not Marshall,
who said that the power was exclusive in Congress, and answered
the above argument with a lawyer's answer:
It is not material, in my view of the subject to in-
quire whether the article a or the should be prefixed to
the word "power." Either, or neither, will produce the
same result; if either, it is clear, that the article "the"
would be the proper one, since the next preceding grant
of power is certainly exclusive, to wit, "to borrow money
on the credit of the United States." 24
That such power was concurrent, Marshall, however, also refused
to accept, for this would be to imply that the states and the Union
were equal sovereignties, and that the sovereign which exercised
the power first would prevail. Marshall was aware, of course, of
the many instances even in his own time where the states and the
federal government had cooperated and some instances at least
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 1, 200, note 11 supra. And at 211, "In pursuing
this inquiry at the bar, it has been said, that the Constitution does not confer
the right of intercourse between state and state ... This is true. The Consti-
tution found it an existing right, and gave to Congress the power to regulate
it. In the exercise of'this power, Congress has passed 'an act




where the government had adopted state law.2  Examples. which
he cited, were Acts of Congress of 1796 and 1799 preventing the
importation of slaves into states prohibiting slavery,26 and the Act
of August 7, 1789, adopting state law on the conduct of pilots.2-
Of these he spoke:
Congress, in that spirit of harmony and conciliation
which ought always to characterize the conduct of govern-
ments standing in the relation which that of the Union
and those of the states bear to each other, has directed
its officers to aid in the execution of these laws; and has,
in some measure, adapted its own legislation to this ob-
ejct, by making provisions in aid of those of the states .
2
And again:
Although Congress cannot enable a state to legislate,
Congress may adopt the provisions of a state on any
subject.
2 9
But then he added:
The nullity of any act inconsistent with the constitu-
tion, is produced by the declaration, that the constitution
is the supreme law. The appropriate application of that
part of the clause which confers the same supremacy on
laws and treaties, is to such acts of the state legislatures,
as do not transcend their powers . . : 3
It is apparent that the great judge did not subscribe to any
theory that congressional legislation adopting state legislation
tended to put both beyond the Constitution. What then was this
power of Congress over commerce? As to this he said:
We are now arrived at the inquiry, what is this
power?
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the
rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power,
like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself,
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges
no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitu-
tion.
31
And while in other parts of the opinion he described commerce
as "intercourse" :12 and the power of Congress over it as "ple-
nary," 33 and thus "described the federal commerce power with a
2 Id. at 205-209.
61 U. S. STAT. 474, 619.
R. S. 4235, 46 U. S. C. A. 211 et seq.








breath never yet exceeded," 34 merely because he declined to define
the power as "concurrent" does not mean he defined it as "exclu-
sive," 35 except to the extent that when exercised exclusively by
Congress, it became, under the supremacy clause, the supreme law
of the land, subject, of course, to the Constitution. And while the
commerce clause is in the Constitution itself, it is an express power
which has no life sleeping.36 The power of Congress is to legislate
into being such as it wills from the grant of power given it by
the people:
The Congress shall have Power: . . . To make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
3 7
This was decided by Marshall in Willson v. Blackbird Creek
Marsh Company,3 8 and in this case, as contrasted with Gibbons v.
Ogden, the silence of Congress was involved. A dam, prusuant to
state law, had been placed over a navigable stream, and he was of
the opinion:
The repugnancy of the law of Delaware to the con-
stitution is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states; a power which has not been so exercised
as to affect the question.
We do not think that.the act . . . can, under all the
circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant
to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state,
or as being in conflict with any law passed on the sub-
ejct. 9 (Italics supplied.)
Now why did Marshall say the latter after deciding the
former? They are inconsistent views. The statement even ac-
quires a certain oracle-like quality. Was it that he foresaw the
enormous power the Supreme Court could wield under such a
doctrine as the silence of Congress, or was he merely saying that
it was only a paper power until exercised? The latter is suggested
in view of what was said by him of Congress in other cases, with
reference to the habeas corpus power of the courts:
"Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1942); and
Levy, OUR CONSTITUTION TOOL OR TESTAMENT? 48, "a far more extensive national
control of business than we have yet been allowed by 'the Court to witness'"
(1941).
Cf. Rutledge in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 262 (1946); rehearing
denied 329 U. S. 249, 67 S. Ct. 497, 91 L. Ed. 705 (1947).
Cf. Frankfurter, id. at 254.
t' Article I, Sec. 8, C1. 18, U. S. CONSTITUTION. The Commerce power is among
the foregoing Powers.




they must have felt, with peculiar force, the
obligation of providing efficient means by which this great
constitutional privilege should receive life and activity;
for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself
would be lost, although no law for its suspension should
be enacted. 0
CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE
The Chief Justice decided another case, Brown v. Maryland,
4 1
purportedly bearing on the commerce clause, and participated, ac-
cording to Justice Story in another, City of New York v. Miln,
42
neither of which would add to the discussion here. It is of interest
to note, however, that Roger Taney, who as an advocate had un-
successfully argued before Marshall on behalf of the taxing power
of a state in Brown v. Maryland, himself, as Chief Justice, ren-
dered the next important decision with reference to the commerce
clause in The License Cases.43 In these cases, he analyzed Gibbons
v. Ogden in the light of Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Com-
pany and said, "The passages I have quoted show that the validity
of the State law was maintained because it was not in conflict
with a law of Congress, although it was confessedly within the
limits of the power granted." 44 Marshall, therefore, according to
Taney, never maintained that the federal commercial power was
exclusively vested in Congress in the absence of congressional leg-
islation.
The view persisted, none the less, that he did, possibly per-
haps of his rather deprecatory remarks in Gibbons v. Ogden 45 as
to the police power of the state, and in Cooley v. Board of War-
dens,4 6 what was apparently believed to be a Solomon decision be-
tween Marshall and Taney 47 was handed down in the form of the
following dictum:
It is the opinion of the majority of the court that the
mere grant to Congress of the power to regulate com-
merce, did not deprive the states of power to regulate
pilots, and that although Congress has legislated on this
subject, its legislation manifests an intention, . . . not
to regulate this subject, but to leave its regulation to
Ex Parte Bollman and Ex Parte Swarthout, 8 U. S. 75, 4 Cranch. 75, 2
L. Ed. 554 (1807).
11 25 U. S. 419, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. Ed. 678 (1827). Marshall's observations
here on the commerce clause come under the heading of dicta; the case was
decided on the supremacy of the tax power of Congress, McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U. S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 519 (1819).
42 36 U. S. 102, 11 Pet. 102, 9 L. Ed. 648 (1837).
4'46 U. S. 504, 12 L. Ed. 256, 5 How. 504 (1847).
Id. at 584.
5 22 U. S. 1, 203, note 11 supra.
46 53 U. S. 299, 12 How. 299, 13 L. Ed. 996 (1851).
11 Haman, Comment on Dean Milk Company v. City of Madison, 340 U. S.
349, 71 S. Ct. 295, 95 L. Ed. 329 (1950). 8 WASH. & LEE L. R. 202 (1951).
DICTA
Sept.-Oct., 1955
the several states. To these precise question, . . . this
opinion must be understood to be confined. It does not
extend to the question what other subjects, under the
commercial power, are within the exclusive control of
Congress 48
By Munn v. Illinois, '4 in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice
Waite, this dictum had grown:
.. certainly, until Congress acts in reference to
their interstate relations, the State may exercise all the
powers of government over them. . . . We do not say
that a case may not arise in which it will be found that
a State, under the form of regulating its own affairs, has
encroached upon the exclusive domain of Congress . .
Then in Mobile County v. Kimball,5 0 in an opinion rendered
by Justice Field, it was said that the federal commerce power
was exclusive so as far as a uniform rule is required but that Con-
gress by silence in the regulation of harbors, virtually declared
that such may be controlled by state authority. While this deci-
sion does not conflict in practice with Willson v. Blackbird Marsh
Company, it conflicts in theory-e.g., Marshall upheld state law
because Congress had not legislated; Field upheld state law be-
cause the Supreme Court felt that, considering other instances
where state regulation had been adopted by Congress, the latter
would have acted as the Court did. Thus the foundation laid by
dicta was solidifying into a structure for judicial legislation. It
was but a short step for Field to concur as he did with Justice
Matthews, who spoke for the Court in Bowman v. Chicago and
Northwestern Railway Company,5 ' a case declaring that state leg-
islation, forbidding common carriers from importing intoxicating
liquor into the state without a certificate therefor, was invalid,
because the consent of Congress express or implied was missing;
in other words, the Court felt that had Congress spoken, it would
have required a national uniform rule. Justice Harlan, with whom
Chief Justice Waite and Justice Gray concurred, dissented, and
Justice Lamar did not participate in the Bowman decision, which
introduced yet another word into the commerce clause, the word,
"consent," was not there . 5 2 The dissenters spoke in vain of the
departure of the Court from the Constitution and precedent:
. . . if therefore, state police power, as the health,
morals and safety of the people may be involved in its
48 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U. S. 299, 320, note 46 supra.
94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1877). Waite renounced this dicta in Bowman
v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company, note 53 post.
ze102 U. S. 691, 26 L. Ed. 238 (1880). The idea of uniformity is probably
derived from Art. I, Section 8, Cl. 4, of the CONSTITUTION, relating to naturaliza-
tion and bankruptcy, and which is the next succeeding clause to the commerce
clause.
125 U. S. 465, 8 S. Ct. 869, 31 L. Ed. 700 (1888).




proper exercise, can be overborne by national regulations
of commerce, the former decisions of this court would
seem to show that such laws of the States are valid, even
when they affect commercial intercourse among the
States, until displaced by Federal legislation, or until they
come in direct conflict with some Act of Congress. Such
was the doctrine announced in Willson v. Blackbird Creek
Marsh Co.
53
In Leisy v. Hardin a similar question as to the power of a
state to prohibit the liquor traffic was before the Court, as was
presented in the previous case, but the majority decision unfor-
tunately was the same.54 Fuller, its author, had joined the Court
as Chief Justice; and perhaps the though of judicial legislation
was too tempting a morsel to the new Chief. And it is noteworthy
that the assumption of the majority in both cases, that had Con-
gress acted it would have enacted a uniform rule, was mistaken
because Congress thereafter enacted the Wilson Act,5 5 adopting
the diverse treatment of states, congressional legislation which
Chief Justice Fuller was obliged to uphold.50 With this setback,
the Court, however, took the next obvious step-If there were an
exclusive jurisdiction in the Congress under the commerce power,
there was also an exclusive residue in the states, and an act of
Congress, which invaded the latter, could be limited to that ex-
tent. And thus a sugar company in control of the large majority
of the manufactories of refined sugar in the United States was
exempted from the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
since the company's activity was a monopoly on "a necessary of
life," United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 57 A far cry from Gibbons
v. Ogden! The result was that when Congress was silent, state
legislation could be invalidated as encroaching upon the former's
desires even though unexpressed; when Congress spoke, its own
legislation could be curtailed as encroaching on the jurisdiction
of the states.
And, not only in economic legislation but also in social legis-
lation did the judges apply their new-found power. In Plessy v.
Ferguson,58 a state law was upheld that required railway com-
panies carrying passengers in coaches in the state to provide sepa-
"Bowman v. Chicago Northwestern Railway Company, 125 U. S. 465, 520-
521, note 51 supra.
5135 U. S. 100, 34 L. Ed. 128 (1890). Despite congressional legislation, oleo-
margarine was, however, afforded different treatment, Plumley v. Mass., 55 U. S.
461, 15 S. Ct. 154, 39 L. Ed. 223 (1894).
"26 STAT. 313, 27 U. S. C. A. 121 (1890).
"in re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 S. Ct. 865, 3'5 L. Ed. 572 (1891).
"' 156 U. S. 1, 15 S. Ct. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325 (1895), involving the Sherman Act,
26 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. 1, et seq. Cf. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,
342 U. S. 143, 72 S. Ct. 181, 96 L. Ed. 162 (1951). Houston v. E. & W. T. R. Co. v.
United States, (Shreveport Rate Cases) 234 U. S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833, 58 L. Ed.
1341 (1914).
"8163 U. S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896).
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rate but equal accommodations for the white and colored races,
whereas a previous statute of the same state requiring carriers
to give equal rights and privileges without distinction as to race
or color was held, so far as it applied to interstate commerce,
void, Hall v. De Cuir.59 In Hammer v. Dagenhart 60 a congressional
prohibition of transportation in interstate commerce of the work
of children was held unconstitutional, while another such provi-
sion against the transportation of "white slaves" did not so offend.'
CONGRESSIONAL CONSENT
"Congress has undoubted power to redefine the distribution
of power over interstate commerce"-Chief Justice Stone in South-
ern Pacific Company v. State of Arizona.
6 2
Then in 1917 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co. and
State of West Virginia 63 sustained a state law, prohibiting im-
portation in interstate commerce of liquor for personal use. If
control of interstate commerce were exclusively vested in Con-
gress what was the justification? It was no answer to say that
Congress had passed the Webb-Kenyon law 64 divesting the arti-
cle of its interstate character, for then the power of Congress
would be no longer exclusive. It was no answer to say that Con-
gress was aiding the state in the exercise of its police power, for
that had been held exclusively to be in the province of the states.
The answer is found possibly in Gibbons v. Ogden: the power ex-
ercised by Congress is a plenary power, which knows no limits
other than those prescribed by the Constitution.
65
The surprise, however, that this decision caused 66 and the
surmise as to the source of the theory underlying it 67 may be con-
sidered as reflections of the incompatibility of the doctrines of
the doctrines of congressional silence and congressional consent.
The former is based on a theory of exclusiveness of powers; the
latter has its base in the comity of powers. The former presumes
that the need assumed by the Supreme Court for a uniform na-
- 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. Ed. 547 (1878). This result was obtained by the Court
in Plessy v. Ferguson, note 58 sitpra, at 546, limiting the rule of Hall v. De Cuir
to interstate as opposed to intrastate commerce, a dichotomy significant perhaps
in 1895. Cf. Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198, 21 S. Ct. 594, 45 L .Ed. 820
(1901) ; Campagnie Francaise v. State Board of Health, 186 U. S. 380, 22 S. Ct.
811, 46 L. Ed. 1209 (1902); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 26 S. Ct. 127.
50 L. Ed. 274 (1905); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 23 S. Ct. 92, 47 L. Ed.
108 (1902).
e 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101 (1918); Bailey v. Drexel Fur-
niture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed. 817 (1922). Cf. Corwin, The
Coommercial Clause Versus States Rights (193'6).
0 Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 S. Ct. 281, 57 L. Ed. 523 (1913).
325 U. S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed. 1915 (1945).
242 U. S. 311, 37 S. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326 (1917).
1 37 STAT. 699, 27 U. S. C. A. 122 (1913).
61 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 1, note 31 supra.
6 See Dowling and Hubbard, Divesting An Article of Its Intcrstate Char-
acter, 5 MisNz. L. R. 100, 253 (1920-21).
61 Murphy, op cit. sitpra note 18.
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tional rule would preclude state action, whether Congress had acted
or not; the latter permits Congress to decide to what extent uni-
formity and diversity should govern. The former makes judges,
legislators; the latter makes legislators, judges, for, as has been
seen, in many of the instances where such legislation has been
enacted, such enactment has been to reverse the Supreme Court.
And because of this, Harlan Stone, while the great proponent
of the power of Congress to redefine the distribution of control
over interstate commerce, was puzzled as to its source, since he
avowedly and frankly was, as a jurist, a great legislator. As a
law school dean, he had assigned his staff after the enactment of
the Webb-Kenyon Act, the task "of finding out all you can about
just how it is that Congress can enable the states to do something
which the Court already had held the states could not do--for
some day that may be an important doctrine." 68 However, as an
associate justice in a dissenting opinion in Di Santo v. Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania,9 his objection was not to the propriety
of striking down state legislation where Congress had not acted,
but in doing so in a situation that he felt called for local treatment
rather than a uniform rule:
The recognition of the power of the states to regulate
commerce within certain limits is a recognition that there
are matters of local concern which may properly be sub-
ject to state regulation .
And he added:
In this case the traditional test of the limit of state
action by inquiring whether the interference with com-
merce is direct or indirect seems to me too mechanical,
. . . we are doing little more than using labels to describe
a result 70
All tihs was said by Stone in 1927 when the Court had then
become entrenched as the arbiter of when the states had invaded
the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress or, conversely, of when Con-
gress had infringed upon matters exclusively the concern of the
states. How far had the Qourt wandered from the guiding hand
of Marshall! There followed in the thirties, however, a return to
Marshall, for Congress undertook, in aiding the states during the
depression years, a federal regulatory program which involved
an interpretation of the commerce clause far different from that
which would have been conceived possible under U. S. v. E. C.
Knight Co. and Hammer v. Dagenhart. The Court's reaction was
immediate, however, and in a series of cases, of which Carter v.
Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 COL.
L. R 547, 552, footnote 19 (1947).




Carter Coal Company 71 and United States v. Butler 72 are 1936
examples, cases which probably precipitated the threat by the
President to pack the Court,'73 declared much of the legislative
program to be invalid as beyond the reach of congressional com-
mercial power. And then Chief Justice Hughes and Associate
Justice Roberts suddenly changed their minds, and, by joining
the minority of the Court, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone, ruled to
the effect that the commerce clause was broad in scope as Marshall
had envisioned !4 Why?
• . . few attributed the difference in results between
the decisions of 1936 and those in 1937 to anything in-
herent in the cases themselves . . . the concensus among
lawyers speculating on the Court's sudden reversal was
that the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Roberts believed
that the continued nullification of the legislative program
• . .would lead to acceptance of the President's Court
plan . . .7
Whether Hughes bowed to expediency or not, the end result
was that very little was left to the states. They were thought
incapable of handling the depression, and congressional aid was
a complete take-over in detailed regulation often in very local
matters. This was the extent of congressional cooperation with
the states in the thirties. In the forties, however, the states' for-
tunes were stabilized by war, Stone had succeeded Hughes as Chief
Justice, and under his leadership the states came in as partners
again in the complex economy. Stone's dissent in the Di Santo
case became the majority's view in California v. Thompson 76 So
as to overrule the former. There he seemed to say that exclusive
power did not reside in Congress, and in the absence of its perti-
nent regulation, the states could regulate. Marshall, in Willson v.
Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., was cited by Stone as authority for
7, 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160 (1936), and see Cardozo's dis-
sent at p. 324, 327, commenting on the word "direct"-" . . . a great principle of
Constitutional law is not susceptible of comprehensive statement in an adjec-
tive."
297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477 (1936).
" Stern, The Comnmerce Clause and The National Economy, 1933-1946; 59
HAsv. L. R. 645, 681 (1946).
,4 N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, and
81 L. Ed. 893 (1937) ; Associated Press v. N. L. R. B., 301 U. S. 103, 57 S. Ct. 650,
81 L. Ed. 953 (1937); and Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. N. L.
R. B., 301 U. S. 142, 57 S. Ct. 648, 81 L. Ed. 965 (1937), sustaining the Wagner
Act, 49 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. 151, et seq. (1935). Interstate commerce prob-
ably now includes rainmaking. Notes, 1 STANFORD L. R. 43, 508 (1948-1949);
migratory birds, id. at 514; and possibly a federal commercial code, Johnson,
Comment, 45 Micn. L. R. -101 (1947).
I Stern, op. cit. supra note 73. As early as 1913, Hughes apparently felt
that the commercial power of Congress was all that Marshall said it was; see
The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 399, 33 S. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, in-
volving the INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT, 24 STAT. 363, 49 U. S. C. A. 11 et seq.
(1887) and see note I supra.
7313 U. S. 109, 61 S. Ct. 931, 85 L. Ed. 1219 (1941).
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such regulation "unless there is conflict with some Act of Con-
gress ;" 7 but then unfortunately, probably unable to resist the
role of the Court as a super-legislature, Stone added that this was
provided that there is no infringement on the national interest
in preserving uniformity in matters of national concern. If any
doubt were cast by this momentary insight, his famous decision
in the Southern Pacific case, an excerpt from which forms a fore-
word to this part, again emphasized the super-legislative function
of the Court:
For a hundred years it has been the accepted consti-
tutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the
aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some pro-
tection from state legislation inimical to the national com-
merce, and that in such cases, where Congress has not
acted, this Court and not the state legislature is under
the commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing
demands of state and national interests.
78
The Chief Justice thus chose not to perceive that the doctrine
of congressional silence is at odds with that of congressional con-
sent, express or implied. For the former is founded in the
commerce clause itself, and the Supreme Court functioning under
such doctrine knows no limitation, since that body has the final
say. But what if Congress speaks and takes the place of the Court,
is joint federal state action, permitting the states to do that which
it could not formerly do; does this combine also transcend the
Constitution? Apparently Justice Rutledge, who inherited Stone's
philosophic robes as foremost advocate of both doctrines, thought
so in 1946 in Prudential Insurance Company v. Butler,79 and this
probably accounts for the implications of that decision.
For while the Court had returned to Marshall in his concept
of the plenary power of Congress so and to his acknowledgment
that the federal government might consent to the states' use of
the police power so as to affect interstate commerce.8 1 Marshall
it might well be believed, had no notion, strong an advocate of the
power of the Court as he was, that it could act for Congress, when
that body was silent.8 2 Thus, while the Court returned to Marshall
to this extent, the return was only partial. The difficulty is that
to retain its powers under the theory of congressional silence is
to magnify the position of Congress, as the Court abdicates and
the former succeeds in power. The danger of this can most clearly
be suggested by Morgan v. Virginia,88 also decided in 1946, wherein
the policy of the Supreme Court had changed since the days of
"Id. at 114.
325 U. S. 761, 769, note 62 supra.
"9 328 U. S. 408, note 2 supra.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 1, note 33 supra.
Id. notes 28 and 29.
Wilison v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U. S. 245, note 39 supra.
328 U. S. 373, 66 S. Ct. 1050, 90 L. Ed. 1317 (1946).
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Hall v. De Cuir and Plessy v. Ferguson, and wherein a state
segregation statute was declared invalid since it was a matter, in
the silence of Congress, where uniformity was, by the Court, felt
desirable. But what then if Congress should adopt state law ?
4
Can Congress enable a state to do that which constitutionally it
could not do? Or was there ever a question of this? Is not the
answer demanded in the negative provided, of course, that it is
finally realized that the states' inability substantially to affect inter-
state commerce, in the absence of congressional legislation, is a
court-made rather than a constitutional prohibition?
CONCLUSION
The present position of the Court imposes an intolerable bur-
den on Congress, which since the war particularly has solicited
state help on national problems, help which, under United States
v. Darby 5 and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. State of Wisconsin,"'!
necessitates express congressional adoption of state law where
Congress does not intend to occupy the field. Even more intoler-
able, however, is the implication of the Prudential case: that when
such consent is given, both federal and state law are, in some de-
gree, beyond the Constitution. Marshall cannot be blamed for this
result, for while he spoke of the "plenary" power of Congress, he
never said that the power was almighty. What he did say was
that, while Congress might permit a state's participation in na-
tional problems, such permission, in every particular, is consent,
also subject to the Constitution.
7
The idea, that in the silence of Congress the Court might act,
is false, born in dicta and flashing into decision in an obscure case.
The Supreme Court, although returning to Marshall in 1937,
nevertheless retained the doctine. To return home part of the way,
however, is perhaps still to remain lost.
84 Justice Rutledge in the Prudential case, indicated that his remarks were
confined to the tax and commercial fields. 328 U. S. 408, 439, note 2 supra.
312 U. S. 100, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941), validating the FAiR LADOR STANDARDS
ACT, 52 STAT. 1060, 29 U. S. C. A. 201 et seq. (1938), overruling Hammer v.
Dagenhart, note 60 supra, and virtually annihilating the Tenth Amendment.
Compare, however, Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. Wood, 344 U. S. 157, 73
S. Ct. 204, 97 L. Ed. 168 (1952), a shift from the tendency to hold state statutes
invalid where Congress had enacted comprehensive legislation, NATIONAL MOTOR
CARRIER ACT, 49 STAT. 543 (1935), as amended, 54 STAT. 919 (1940), 49 U. S.
C. A. 301 et seq.
88347 U. S. 672, 74 S. Ct. 794, 99 L. Ed ..... (1954), where the Court, review-
ing the legislative history of the NATURAL GAS ACT, 52 STAT. 821, 15 U. S. C. A.
717 et seq. (1938), overruled the Federal Power Commission, which had declined
jurisdiction over "gatherers and producers." Cf. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
Co. v. Public Service Commission, 322 U. S. 507, 68 S. Ct. 190, 92 L. Ed. 128
(1947), where Justice Rutledge, in view of the same legislative history, treated
the Natural Gas Act in much the same manner as the McCarran Act, note 3
supra. But see Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U. S. 157, 74
S. Ct. 396, 99 L. Ed .--. (1954).
"Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 1, note 30 supra.
8Bowman v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465, note
51 mtpra.
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